There was the-morality-of-fourth-century-Athens, there were the-moralities-ofthirteenth-century-Western-Europe, there are numerous such moralities, but where ever was or is morality as such? A. MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 266 Sumário: Reavaliando alguns escritos de MacIntyre, o artigo tenta extrair, no pensamento do filósofo escocês, os principais traços do tipo particular de historicismo desenvolvido por MacIntyre em oposiçao à metodologia de pesquisa perseguida pela "ortodoxia acadêmica". Na verdade, a ortodoxia acadêmica, responsável pelo estado de crise na cultura contemporânea, fracasso una tentativa de dar uma solução ao desacordo moral. Assim, era necessário explicitar outra perspectiva filosófica para resolver o desarcordo moral.
factual and moral statements, that is, the distinction between "is" and "ought"; and pursued in attempting to legitimize the encyclopedic system of knowledge and, at the same time, to release philosophy from false problems bound up with metaphysical standpoints.
Furthermore, as we know, according to the logical positivist programme, the validity of the knowledge and as a consequence the removal of any metaphysical view from the knowledge equipment, are obtained by applying on the system of knowledge the method of logical analysis of language 3 . Such application allows us to classify as pseudo-propositions all the statements that do not respect the so-called principle of empirical significance. It is worth reminding that according to this setting " [T] o be meaningful is to be testable, to be verifiable by sense-experience; to be unverifiable is to be meaningless" 4 .
This kind of methodological approach had led to look askance at that subject matter as history and in general humanities whose judgements were included out both from the set of tautological statements and from the set of empirically verifiable one. Nevertheless, for these statements left open the possibility to put them within the new system of knowledge only if it was possible their epistemological refoundation 5 , that involved a reduction of value utterances to factual ones. For this reason it was essential keeping out from the analysis of humanities the becoming dimension and therefore it was necessary to consider them without reference to their history also because their history would not provided any hint about their own development.
As we well know, logical positivist supporters while reacting to the various form of neo-idealist historicism argued that the only possible enquiry could be just that tied to the analysis of the logical-formal structure of the statements, which 3 The reference is to R. Thus, according to the Scottish philosopher, the supporters of neopositivist epistemology, whom he links up to the supporters of academic orthodoxy, hold that analysis of ethical issues must set aside reference to the historical if it wants to remain into the encyclopedic system of knowledge. Therefore, the ethical enquiry should focus instead on the analysis of the logical-formal structure of moral concepts, whose setting leads us to consider the ethical issues as whether they had the same characteristics regardless of the reference to their history.
However, this methodological approach, which is expressed in a research of argumentative accuracy based on the introduction of logical rulesalthough pursued to clarify 7 and to provide stability and consistency to the knowledge by removing it from the mutability of the becoming -would have generated such a state of confusion that it is impossible to distinguish the conceptual difference between the Greek "triremes" and "steamships". Such confusion would have led to persist in translating the term "trireme" with the term "steamship" 8 , which according to MacIntyre portrays the "inability to confront the moral philosophy of the very culture inheritance from which made our own moral philosophy possible" 9 , that is, the inability to understand where the current moral philosophy comes from.
In other words neo-positivist approach that in order to reach expositive and explicative clarity uses a kind of methodology that works by isolating, atomizing and abstracting arbitrarily philosophical issues from their relationship with the historical and cultural context, it would lead to unintelligibility of concepts and philosophical questions. In addition, in such a situation even the attempts of analytical approach aimed at the clarification of the meaning of philosophical language would be useless because they would only lead to the proliferation of rival theories featured by incommensurability.
Therefore, according to the macintyrean outlook, the methodological framework built by academic orthodoxy would be a negative way of addressing the research in the field of moral philosophy (and in general in the philosophical field).
Because it would reduce ethical judgments to fragments and simulacra of morality, "deprived of any status that can secure their authority" 10 , that would have reduced them "to a rationally opaque collection rules" 11 . an epistemology such as that neoposivist one, which does not take an account of the historicity, discloses itself as a barren approach 13 , as a point of view without "rational way of securing moral agreement in our culture" 14 .
From here springs the endlessness of the moral debate, rediscovered by the features of conceptual incommensurability of the rival premises whose each one appeals himself or herself to the claim of impersonality of these arguments, and last but not least, even to summarize the previous premises, by the lack of any reference to the historical feature of moral concepts. That means losing both the awareness of the influence of social and historical context within which such judgments are formed and to the awareness that evaluative utterance we use switch their meaning through the time 15 .
It is the spread of these aspects in contemporary culture that has prevented the comparison of theories in order to overcoming the moral disagreement and, at the same time, has reduced the justification of ethical principles to a matter of individual choice. Therefore, the strategic importance of the re-evaluation of the magnitude of the historicity identified by MacIntyre implies the awareness that so far overcoming of the intractable feature of the moral argument has been prevented by "the persistently unhistorical treatment of moral philosophy by contemporary philosophers in both the writings about and the teaching of the subject" 16 . Ibidem. Even here MacIntyre is quoting Collingwood who about realist wrote that they "thought that the problems with which philosophy is concerned were unchanging" and that the ancient philosophers "had alla asked themselves the same set of questions, and had given different answers to them". and cultural framework that leads to the awareness that "understand each philosophy in terms of the historical context of tradition, social order, and conflict out of which it emerged" 22 .
So First of all, it is interesting to note that in this paper the effort to restore methodological enquiry's honor that takes an account of historical dimension of knowledge (that is, the defense of the authentic historical materialism) passes through the recognition of the validity of the critique that Popper addresses to historicism understood as "this doctrine that historical development is governed by laws and that its future course is therefore predictable" 27 .
In this regard it should be noted, albeit broadly, that Popper's argument against the historicism and thus against the Marxism, grafted into the trunk of the epistemological debate against the inductivism, according to which the scientific efficiency's criterion rests on verification and testability of the theory, is mainly directed on the questioning of deterministic predictability of the necessary historical development that led to the establishment of a closed society ruled by absolute and but forasmuch as the criterion of falsifiability is not applicable to the historicist theories, they remain into the unscientific field.
Popper's criticism against the historicism is ultimately the opposition to the view of history understood as a process oriented towards a necessary end, as a mechanical and automatic process, heritage of those philosophies that had anchored the history to a providential view that, by subordinating the becoming to a final end, had put human action to a level of secondary importance compared with the activity of the spirit, conceived as a profound historical reality or truth that drives evolution.
Within this outlook, which corresponds to the classical Marxist standpoint, the role of the human being is reduced to that of a simple spectator of the historical development of which he or she can know the structure and functioning but cannot interfere with it or change it. In other words, human beings through a process of objectification of historical reality are able to know it by seizing the laws governing the becoming, but in any way they cannot interfere on the future course of events with their actions.
However, that theory of history in which the human being is somehow overwhelmed by the historical development, according to Popper corresponds with Marxism, and in the macintyrean standpoint it is nothing but the doctrine defended by To be impeached is primarily the Hume's account of causality according to which an event causes another event close to it if its occurrence is a necessary and sufficient condition for the occurrence of the next event that is the effect whose predictability is given by the consistency and uniformity of relationship that is established between antecedent and consequent.
And it is essentially to this form of epistemic determinism, according to which causality has been intended as a dyadic relationship 39 , that historical knowledge cannot be brought back, because causality is essentially "a relationship between at least four items" 40 , although that has been ignored both by the supporters of Stalinism and by the supporters of the neopositivist programme of standardization based on a strong reductionist approach according to which the whole reality accessible to human being must use only a single method of analysis.
Therefore, MacIntyre is now committed to provide a positive account of the process of historical knowledge, which by the epistemological point of view means to reassert the contextualist conception of rationality and, by the methodological point of view, means to pinpoint into the historical and narrative structure a set of tools able to justify the rational superiority of one theory compared to the rival one. on October 1977 dedicated to "Historicism and Epistemology".
In this very important contribution, in which the author lays the methodological basis of his philosophy of history, it begins to take shape the centrality of the historical-narrative method, that here it characterizes the scientific problems and that it will be again affirmed for the narrative building up of the moral issues which he dealt with in the later writings and especially in the book of 1981.
It is evident that also this essay, in which MacIntyre expresses his interest for the season of changes that is affecting the philosophy of science, is part of the renewal process of the conception of history freed from dogmatism to which the previous tradition had bound it. All that means, on the one hand, to commit for making free the philosophy of history from the conception according to which historical development is characterized as a movement dependent either by some shape of consciousness that stands beyond history (i.e the hegelian idea of absolute spirit) or by some form of rigid legalism (i.e the neopositivist idea of generalization laws); and on the other hand aims to make free the history from the consideration of being "a repository for more than anecdote or chronology" 43 . Moreover, this engagement would recognize to the new concept of history a central role in the reflection on the progress of knowledge. Nevertheless the macintyrean interest for the "new philosophy of science" is connected not only to the importance that the new setting of research gives to the historical dimension in the debate concerning the development of science, but also to the criticism that it is aroused against the value-freedom claim of scientific statements to which the new epistemology opposes the awareness that the facts are actually already value-laden, as Kuhn remembers when he writes "[…] the two groups of scientists see different things when they look from the same point in the same direction" 44 ; a position that in the macintyrean process of renewal of the historical doctrine implies the awareness that history "is not an evaluatively neutral chronicle" 45 .
The new setting of enquiry questioning the alleged neutrality of scientific speech is also highlighting the weaknesses of the neopositivist epistemic system founded on the conception of instrumental rationality that in order to ensure the objectivity and universality of knowledge or had reduced the historicist doctrine to a form of determinism or had removed from philosophical inquiry any reference to the historical becoming without realize, as MacIntyre points out, that:
Scientific reason turns out to be subordinate to, and intelligible only in terms of, historical reason. And, if this is true of natural sciences, a fortiori it will be true also of the social sciences 46 .
So from MacIntyre's outlook to hold the historicist perspective means to defend the rapprochement of philosophy to the history of philosophy, and the primacy of historical reason over scientific reason, which it implies the rejection of "conception of ideal rationality", that is, the rejection of "Enlightenment conception of "pure" To approve the historical reason means defending and recognizing that reality is always in becoming (in fieri), that reality is an uninterrupted process of historical development and this outlook implies the defense of the contextualist, practical and individualizing knowledge that leads our author to admit that philosophical concepts, that are forms of thought, cannot be separated from their historical and practical development.
Needless to remark at this point that the opposition that MacIntyre has portrayed on the epistemological level between scientific and historical reason, that corresponds to the opposition between instrumental and practical reason or in other words to the opposition between universalism and contextualism, it has its counterpart, on the methodological level, to the rejection of the explanatorypredictive methodology based on the causality's account as a dyadic relationship, to which MacIntyre opposes awareness of the need to pinpoint a new methodology appropriate to the understanding of the historical and procedural structure of reality.
Indeed, to the acknowledgement that reality is a cognitive category in becoming (in fieri) corresponds the awareness of the inadequacy of the methodology based on the principle of mechanical causality, and all this leads the author to look for an enquiry method that it takes into account the historicity in which the human being and the knowledge are immersed.
If it is true that for the rehabilitation of the historicity by the epistemological standpoint MacIntyre looks favorably to the debate developed into the philosophy of science, and especially to the work of Lakatos, who was trying to defend the theoretical value of the historicity within scientific enquiry when writes In effect, to the structural conception of the time understood as a reversible order that allowed the application of a methodology of deterministic explanation of events always identical to themselves, to which corresponds an | Pensando -Revista de Filosofia Vol. 6, Nº 11, 2015 ISSN 2178-843X epistemological conception that, in a sense, merely reflects the phenomena (the spectator theory of knowledge), it is set against a procedural conception of time understood as a direction, as irreversible process that needs a survey methodology that can capture in the present the past that it is encapsulated inside it, counterpart of the critical realist epistemological perspective.
According such a conception of temporality, the following of events can not be made intelligible through use of the explanatory-predictive method because the events arranged in a direction of irreversible appear inextricably linked to the specific circumstances of space and time and therefore they need of a methodology adequate to give an account of their structure. Indeed, if the reality is recognized as becoming, as historicity not reified or made absolute, then it will require a methodology of enquiry that is able to capture the vision of the diachronic development of reality.
What MacIntyre sustains through these suggestions is not only acknowledgement of narrative character of reality and historical knowledge but is also the claim of a historical-narrative method intrinsic to the enquiry, a position that opposes to the explanatory-predictive method a historical-narrative methodology capable of making intelligible phenomena without appealing to foreign elements, namely without elements that are outside from the narrative itself. 
Conclusion
The attempt of reconstruction of the historicist approach to the philosophical enquiry in MacIntyre, is emerged through comparison with some minor works of the author, and it makes clear his strong anti-neopositivist orientation, developed in the effort to identify a method that can provide a rational response to the problem of moral disagreement, that means to pinpoint a criterion of rational choice between ethical rival theories.
Given in these terms the issue of disagreement reveals in primis the issue of a preliminary reflection on the concept of rationality. Which rationality must we appeal to for settling the moral disagreement? Given that the attempts carried out by an approach based on a pure, ideal and abstract concept of rationality did not provide the appropriate tools to ensure the overcoming of the moral disagreement, but on the contrary would led to the proliferation of conflicting theories and incommensurable traditions that make impossible the choice between rival bodies of theory, because the concept of incommensurability always suppose the lack of shared beliefs, it was necessary to give up on the concept of rationality that led to hypostatize philosophical concepts.
Therefore, given the problem of disagreement as a matter of historical development of the theories it was necessary to defend a contextualist conception of rationality that is able to grasp the procedural nature of reality and knowledge, which results in an attempt to make intelligible the becoming. These suggestions have prompted to put close the macintyrean epistemological outlook to that one of some conceptual change can still be rational, even without any claim that one is thereby adopting an outlook that has a greater degree of absolute validity" 51 .
Indeed in the postscript to AV MacIntyre points out that he holds "not only that historical enquiry is required in order to establish what a particular point of view is, but also that it is in its historical encounter that any given point of view establishes or fails to establish its rational superiority relative to its particular rivals in some specific contexts" 52 .
Now it is exactly this acknowledgement of the possibility of choice between incommensurable traditions through the rational criterion that commits
MacIntyre in the defense of a realist form of historicism that is able to sustain the rational choice between incommensurable theories or traditions in the extent that it is able to pinpoint a criterion of intelligibility of the failure of a tradition over the another. Only in this way the comparison between rival traditions, which is always in the MacIntyre's outlook, a comparison of conceptual schemes inner to each traditionresearch, may leave open the possibility "that in any particular field, whether the natural sciences or morality-and-moral-philosophy, or the theory of theory, some new challenge to the established best theory so far will appear and will displace it" 53 .
The theoretical effort that the author has to face, after highlighting the flaws of the "spectator theory" of knowledge, is to set out a theory of knowledge that can give a rational justification of the alleged superiority of one theory over another without falling down in some form of ethnocentric error that claims to rise their own values and own conceptual frameworks to a level of superiority over the rival values and schemata. In other words, the MacIntyre's effort is to be able to provide a rational justification for the Enlightenment project failure and likewise gives an account of the rational superiority of the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition compared to other traditions-research, given their incommensurability or the lack of shared conceptual 51 R. 
